Tag: lawsuit

Declaratory Judgments in Georgia

Posted by Jeff on

New Georgia Supreme Court

What is a declaratory judgment? When is it helpful? When can it be used? These questions were answered by the Georgia Supreme Court in Cobb County v. Floam, __ Ga. __ (S24A0599, decided May 9, 2024).

Simply put, declaratory judgments are designed to provide legal guidance to a party uncertain about their future legal rights. For example, in a contract dispute, if parties disagree regarding the future performance of a contract term, either party may seek a declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment is appropriate in this situation because a clear understanding of the parties’ future rights is necessary to help or protect the parties determine their future conduct.

Existing Georgia Statutory Law

By statute, the Georgia legislature instructs that Georgia courts are entitled “to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for such declaration” “[i]n cases of actual controversy” and “in any civil case in which . . . the ends of justice [so] require[.]” OCGA § 9-4-2(a), (b). The Georgia legislature further instructs a declaratory judgment “is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations[.]” OCGA § 9-4-1.

Yes, the above language is vague . . . even for attorneys. “Actual controversy” and “ends of justice” are not exactly objective measures. Since the above law was passed in 1946, Georgia courts have issued many decisions interpreting these laws, culminating in the most recent Georgia Supreme Court decision mentioned above.

Like a United States Supreme Court decision, when the Georgia Supreme Court tackles an issue, it creates a strong precedent that usually applies for many years. Thus, Floam is a significant case. Floam confirms that a declaratory judgment is appropriate only when it will “direct the plaintiff’s future conduct” but is not appropriate to decide already accrued rights. Floam explains that a declaratory judgment is not to resolve “academic debates or deciding purely theoretical questions” but only to offer “relief from the threat of wrongful acts and injuries yet to come.”

At issue in Floam was the Floams’ allegation that a recent redistricting in Cobb County was unconstitutional. In particular, the Floams claimed that they had voted for a specific commissioner before the redistricting but are now represented by a different commissioner.

The Takeaway

Applying the above analysis, the Supreme Court determined that the Floams claim had “no relation to any uncertainty as to their future conduct. The Floams frame their right as the right to be represented by the person for whom they voted. But any violation of such a right occurred once the BOC Amendment took effect, and the Floams have not alleged how that past violation creates uncertainty as to their future conduct.” Thus, while redistricting may or may not have been unconstitutional, the Floams could not obtain a declaratory judgment because they did not allege a possible future injury.

Floam concludes by warning that despite its ruling, the proposed redistricting in Cobb County will no doubt impact Cobb residents in the future. It explains that its decision is limited only to the facts presented by the Floams. Reading between the lines, the outcome likely would have been different had the Floams made a better argument, i.e., not being able to vote for the same commissioner was not persuassive.

Call Us!

While Floam involves government law, it provides valuable instruction for reaal estate and business disputes, where declaratory judgments can be critical. Please call us at 404-382-9994 with any litigation-related questions.

Quiet Title, Adverse Possession, and Color of Title

Posted by Jeff on

The title of this blog encompasses three differing but often overlapping areas of Georgia law. The Georgia Court of Appeals decided a case involving all three: quiet title, adverse possession, and color of title. See Brownphil, LLC v. Cudjoe, __ Ga. App. __ (March 14, 2024, A23A1762).

To understand the case, we have to quickly review the title history. The property was obtained by Earnest and Louise McClendon in 1958. They conveyed their interest to Grier Construction Company (owned by Freddie Grier). In 1997, Freddie Grier—not Grier Construction—conveyed the property to Cudjoe. Brownphil got involved when he got a quitclaim deed from Earnest and Louis McClendon’s heirs.

Brownphil filed a quiet title action to clear the title of the property, claiming that Cudjoe did not have an interest in the property because Grier Construction was not incorporated at the time it received the property from Earnest and Louise McClendon and because Freddie Grier—the party that granted the property to Cudjoe—was never on the title. Cudjoe argued that he obtained full title by adverse possession.

Interestingly, the special master appointed to the case sided with Brownphil. But, after a hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of Cudjoe.

An appeal followed in which Brownphil argued that Cudjoe had not done enough to establish adverse possession. After receiving a deed from Freddie Grier, Cudjoe paid the property taxes and mowed the lawn. Brownphil argued that paying taxes and lawn mowing are insufficient to gain title by adverse possession.

After reviewing the facts and prior cases, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cudjoe. The Court of Appeals cited the legal doctrine of “color of title” as the main reason for favoring Cudjoe. Color of title means that someone has a writing (usually a deed) that appears to grant them title. When someone has color of title, importantly, they only have to show seven years of adverse possession and the element of “notoriety” usually required for adverse possession is waived. Notoriety means placing the world on notice that you adversely possess the property. Only having to show seven years and not having to establish notoriety makes it much easier to display adverse possession.

Based on this easier standard, the Court of Appeals found that Cudjoe had shown enough to obtain title to the property through adverse possession.

If you have any questions regarding a quiet title, adverse possession, or color of title, please call us at 404-382-9994.   

Venue In An Uninsured Motorist Lawsuit

Posted by Jeff on

The Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that an uninsured motorist lawsuit against a known defendant and an unknown defendant can be brought in the county where the accident occurred. Carpenter v. McMann et al., S17G1894 (8/2/18).

The Georgia Constitution says, generally, that lawsuits must be filed in the county in which the responsible party resides. But, it also says that if there are two or more responsible parties who reside in different counties, the lawsuit can be filed in either of the defendants’ “home” counties.

In Carpenter, one of the (alleged) responsible parties left the scene of the collision and was therefore unknown. Lawyers and the courts label these unknown parties as “John or Jane Does.” Under Georgia uninsured motorist law, a lawsuit against a John or Jane Doe can be brought in the county where the collision occurred. What is a little unusual in Carpenter is there was one known defendant and one unknown defendant.

The question before the Georgia Supreme Court was whether the lawsuit should have been filed in the county where the known defendant resided instead of where the collision occurred. Reading the Georgia constitution and relevant statutory provisions together, the Court found that the plain language of drafted by the Georgia legislature permitted the injured party to choose the county where the collision occurred (via the unknown driver) and not the county where the known driver resided.